I've been thinking about this a lot and I'm just going to unload some of it here in first-draft/wall-of-text form because I'm curious what others think and this article is a decent set up.

Full disclosure: I am a Sanders supporter, but not the radically anti-Hillary type. However: I write in hopes that, if anyone of any affiliation sees this and feels like weighing in, we can speak more broadly about the nature of the Dem party's superdelegate system, not the specific issues, candidates, and delegate math of the current Dem primary. Also, if you feel like playing the solutions game after reading, I'd like to propose one limitation, just for the fun of it: no third-party solutions. As will (hopefully) become clear, I'm curious to hear more about how one party - in this case the Democrats - might address the potential and actual issues surrounding superdelegates internally, without a significant intra-party schism or the creation of election-proof power brokers. I have no solution in mind and there may not be one, but it's a neat little puzzle.

So, I feel that the current primary contest is exposing much about the superdelegate system that I don't know if even its creators really thought through. That said, I think in the exchange in the article both Younger and Metcalfe were being too coy. They both must know that superdelegates were conceived, in part, to do exactly what Metcalfe is doing: prefer the nomination of the party insider candidate in the event of a challenge by a durable, popular, 'outsider' candidate. In fact, that may be their only unalienable function, despite their tradition of ultimately pledging their support to the winner of the majority of bound delegates.

We may be seeing a real test of the superdelegate system's weaknesses now, but a test of whether or not the system can be called wise at all is possible. The 'will of the people (read: primary voters)' idea that Younger argues for, and the 'fall in behind the candidate with the majority of the bound delegates' method that has become the norm and which Metcalfe is apparently upholding, are both just ad hoc ideals. They benefit from ostensibly promising results that would serve democratic principles or Democratic solidarity, respectively. They also benefit from the heretofore mostly ceremonial nature of the superdelegate system. The potential weakness in all this lies in the fact that neither ideal has truly been tested by a split delegate (super and bound) count before, neither rests on constitutional law, and most notably, neither promised result actually requires superdelegates to be achieved. In theory anyway, voting expresses the will of the people while the nominee's general election platform and gracious acquiescence by the second place finisher produces solidarity.

But this time around there's some chance that superdelegates may (arguably) make it harder for anyone but the DNC to assert that their existence is wise or even necessary. Consider the following hypothetical future situation: if either the outsider or insider/DNC candidate falls only a few delegates short of a tie in pledged delegates, there could be real reason to doubt the wisdom of having superdelegates and their ability to preserve either the will of the voters and party solidarity, let alone both. Their clearest duty would appear to be to the DNC in such a case. In the current, non-hypothetical context their loyalty to the DNC (an unspoken prerequisite of the superdelegate gig, as I un...

I've been thinking about this a lot and I'm just going to unload some of it here in first-draft/wall-of-text form because I'm curious what others think and this article is a decent set up.

Full disclosure: I am a Sanders supporter, but not the radically anti-Hillary type. However: I write in hopes that, if anyone of any affiliation sees this and feels like weighing in, we can speak more broadly about the nature of the Dem party's superdelegate system, not the specific issues, candidates, and delegate math of the current Dem primary. Also, if you feel like playing the solutions game after reading, I'd like to propose one limitation, just for the fun of it: no third-party solutions. As will (hopefully) become clear, I'm curious to hear more about how one party - in this case the Democrats - might address the potential and actual issues surrounding superdelegates internally, without a significant intra-party schism or the creation of election-proof power brokers. I have no solution in mind and there may not be one, but it's a neat little puzzle.

So, I feel that the current primary contest is exposing much about the superdelegate system that I don't know if even its creators really thought through. That said, I think in the exchange in the article both Younger and Metcalfe were being too coy. They both must know that superdelegates were conceived, in part, to do exactly what Metcalfe is doing: prefer the nomination of the party insider candidate in the event of a challenge by a durable, popular, 'outsider' candidate. In fact, that may be their only unalienable function, despite their tradition of ultimately pledging their support to the winner of the majority of bound delegates.

We may be seeing a real test of the superdelegate system's weaknesses now, but a test of whether or not the system can be called wise at all is possible. The 'will of the people (read: primary voters)' idea that Younger argues for, and the 'fall in behind the candidate with the majority of the bound delegates' method that has become the norm and which Metcalfe is apparently upholding, are both just ad hoc ideals. They benefit from ostensibly promising results that would serve democratic principles or Democratic solidarity, respectively. They also benefit from the heretofore mostly ceremonial nature of the superdelegate system. The potential weakness in all this lies in the fact that neither ideal has truly been tested by a split delegate (super and bound) count before, neither rests on constitutional law, and most notably, neither promised result actually requires superdelegates to be achieved. In theory anyway, voting expresses the will of the people while the nominee's general election platform and gracious acquiescence by the second place finisher produces solidarity.

But this time around there's some chance that superdelegates may (arguably) make it harder for anyone but the DNC to assert that their existence is wise or even necessary. Consider the following hypothetical future situation: if either the outsider or insider/DNC candidate falls only a few delegates short of a tie in pledged delegates, there could be real reason to doubt the wisdom of having superdelegates and their ability to preserve either the will of the voters and party solidarity, let alone both. Their clearest duty would appear to be to the DNC in such a case. In the current, non-hypothetical context their loyalty to the DNC (an unspoken prerequisite of the superdelegate gig, as I understand it) looks like undemocratic cronyism to Sanders supporters while feeling like a firewall and an earned privilege to Clinton supporters. And as it happens, these perceptions play right into each side's argument about the state of politics and the value of their opponent's ideas. The result is a hardening of the divide between them on the subject - see the article for this kind of discourse - that would only get worse in our hypothetical situation if most superdelegates chose to vote for the DNC's preferred candidate. That's an issue because the primaries are supposed to about issues, not how superdelegates ought to vote, even when an 'establishment v. outsider' dynamic is in play. IMO, democracy is always best served by the playing field being rigidly level, especially while the status quo is being respectfully challenged. Any appearance of an institutional advantage for one side in such a contest will necessarily open any result to charges of illegitimacy that can damage the national psyche for a long time. Maybe we can avoid that.

If there is any chance that the role of superdelegates could be reduced by a simple stress test like this primary to that of coerced DNC agents or rebels refusing to toe the DNC line, the size and shape of their role should be reconsidered, IMO. And if they have always been committee agents, allowed to operate independently thus far only because it hasn't been necessary to leverage their loyalty to decide a primary in favor of the party's most powerful, they're also a vulnerability waiting to be exploited. To wit, whether or not you think the DNC is a trustworthy decider/arbiter of primary contests right now, the real question for citizens and Democrats might be: will the DNC, via its appointed superdelegates, always be the best decider/arbiter of a primary, or is it possible that superdelegates should have something more like a checks-and-balances role?

Obviously, the GOP's current state points to an argument for some force to counter the rise of a rogue candidate under the party's banner. And it shows that in some cases deploying superdelegates might not be enough to save the party from schism. But what if a demagogue (or autocrat, or theocrat, or whomever) with minority support takes over the party apparatus/national committee/superdelegates rather than simply winning a consequential number of primary votes? Unlikely, but possible - and the GOP primary is nothing if not a lesson in the folly of betting against the unlikely. Should such a person have 719 superdelegates to distribute at will? Does the private (as in not constitutionally mandated) nature of party primaries/caucuses mean the will of voters should always be able to be subordinated to the will of the organization? How can a party avoid divisiveness created by, and/or abuse of, a system whose cracks can be exposed even by a relatively tame 'outsider' challenge to party orthodoxy/hierarchy? Is there another device or institution that can theoretically achieve the same function without causing a schism, exposing the party to hostile takeover by minority interests, or the entrenchment of a few power brokers? What are the ethical goals and limitations of such a device or institution?

TL;DR: IMO the article shows well that superdelegates are an institution that may be more contentious than useful, even in the course of "normal" primary events that simply challenge the party's ideological status quo. Their clearest-cut function - ensuring that the party apparatus remains in control of who their nominee will be in the face of a challenge - is also a potential vulnerability. There are good reasons to be able to push back against rogue candidates, but party-appointed superdelegates seem imperfect for the job in several ways. Is there a better solution?